Free Practice Questions for the SailPoint Professional Identity-Security-Administrator Exam (2026 Updated)

This is a valid integration approach. Identity Security Cloud does not require every authoritative source to correspond to a purpose-built SaaS connector. For custom or legacy systems, generic integration mechanisms can expose the authoritative account or personnel information needed to construct identities.

A Delimited File source can load account information exported from a system into Identity Security Cloud. SailPoint describes the Delimited File connector as a general-purpose mechanism that reads account data from files and supports customizable account schemas. A database-backed custom HR application can instead be integrated through an appropriate JDBC/database connector when its personnel information is accessible through relational tables.

After creating the source, an Identity Profile can be associated with it to make that source authoritative. SailPoint states that when a source is configured as authoritative through an Identity Profile, an Identity Security Cloud identity is created for each applicable authoritative account.

The administrator must still design a reliable schema, uniquely identify contractors, configure required identity attributes, and determine suitable correlation and lifecycle mappings. Nevertheless, Delimited File and JDBC-style integrations are legitimate approaches for legacy authoritative data.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Authoritative Sources, Generic Connectors, Delimited File Integration, JDBC Integration and Identity Profiles.

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The statement is incorrect because Identity Security Cloud Search and reporting are not restricted to identity records. Search supports multiple governance data categories, and scheduled saved-search subscriptions can return records from the results tab associated with the saved search.

Searchable information includes identities as well as other important governance objects and operational records, including entitlements, access profiles, roles, events, and account activity. Audit reporting itself is implemented through Search, demonstrating that reporting extends well beyond identity queries. For example, administrators can investigate authentication events, provisioning activity, source-related events, access-request activity, and other audit information.

When a saved search is subscribed to, Identity Security Cloud generates recurring results based on the tab selected when the search was saved. Therefore, restricting scheduled reporting conceptually to identity-only searches would remove substantial audit and governance functionality that the platform expressly supports. SailPoint's documentation describes both the multiple Search data models and the ability of scheduled searches to return results from the selected results tab.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Search Data Models, Saved Searches, Reporting and Scheduled Search Subscriptions.

This is not a valid explanation for why a requestable entitlement is missing. An entitlement being included in an access profile does not inherently mean that the entitlement becomes hidden from the Request Center. Identity Security Cloud supports direct entitlement requests as well as requests for access profiles that bundle multiple entitlements.

SailPoint explicitly states that entitlements can be configured for direct access requests and can also be grouped into access profiles. Likewise, access profiles can independently be configured as requestable objects. Therefore, membership in an access profile is not itself the troubleshooting condition that determines whether the underlying entitlement is requestable.

The more relevant checks are whether entitlement requests are globally enabled, whether the newly aggregated group actually exists as an entitlement in Identity Security Cloud, and whether its Requestable status is enabled. SailPoint's entitlement-request configuration explicitly requires both global enablement and entitlement-level requestability.

Consequently, assuming that the group has disappeared simply because an access profile contains it is technically incorrect.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Entitlements, Access Profiles, Direct Entitlement Requests and Request Center Configuration.

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This statement is correct and closely matches SailPoint's official definition of a source. Identity Security Cloud does not treat an external enterprise system itself as being physically contained within the tenant. Instead, it creates a source definition representing that application, database, directory, HR system, or other managed environment.

The source definition supplies the governance context through which Identity Security Cloud interacts with the underlying system. A connector gathers account and access information and associates that data with the source. Identity Security Cloud can then correlate source accounts to identities, aggregate entitlements, model access, perform certifications, support access requests, and—in the case of writable connectors—provision changes back to the external system.

SailPoint's current source-management documentation explicitly defines a source as the Identity Security Cloud representation of a third-party enterprise application, database, or directory-management system maintaining its own user accounts or personnel records.

This distinction between source and connector is important: the source is the governed system representation, while the connector provides the technical mechanism used to communicate with that system.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Source Definitions, Connector Definitions, Source Accounts and Enterprise System Integration.

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Waiting for an identity refresh is not the correct remediation for a missing source entitlement. Identity processing and entitlement aggregation perform different functions. Identity processing recalculates identity-related information and access relationships based on information already known to Identity Security Cloud; it does not independently discover a newly created entitlement that has never been successfully loaded from the external source.

New entitlement objects are discovered through entitlement aggregation or through supported account aggregation behavior, depending on the source and connector. SailPoint defines entitlement aggregation as the process of loading entitlement data from an external source into Identity Security Cloud. The completed aggregation records how many entitlements were discovered.

If an expected entitlement is absent, the administrator should inspect the source's entitlement configuration and schema, review aggregation status/history, confirm that the external entitlement exists, and run or troubleshoot an entitlement aggregation. SailPoint's troubleshooting guidance specifically directs administrators to perform entitlement aggregation when entitlement metadata is not being imported correctly.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Entitlement Aggregation, Entitlement Schemas, Aggregation Troubleshooting and Identity Processing.

The statement is correct. During an Identity Security Cloud certification, the reviewer evaluates each required access item and records the appropriate decision—for example, approving or revoking access. The certification cannot be properly completed while required review items remain undecided.

SailPoint's current user documentation states that after the reviewer has reviewed each item , the reviewer is taken to the sign-off page to complete the certification. The reviewer then selects Finish to submit the decisions and move the certification into the completed state. SailPoint's certification overview likewise describes the sequence as reviewing assigned access, approving or revoking items, and then signing off on those decisions.

Sign-off has governance significance beyond the user-interface transition. Revocation decisions that have not been signed off are not treated as finalized remediation instructions. SailPoint explicitly warns that unsigned revoke decisions are not applied and can be treated as undecided when a campaign is administratively completed.

Therefore, completion of the required decisions is the prerequisite that brings the reviewer to the certification sign-off stage.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Access Certifications, Review Decisions, Certification Sign-Off and Campaign Completion.

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The statement is incorrect. A role does not have to be requestable in Identity Security Cloud. Requestability is an optional capability used when organizations want users to obtain a role through the Request Center.

Roles can instead be assigned automatically according to Standard Criteria or an Identity List. When an identity satisfies automated assignment conditions, the role and associated access can be granted through identity processing without the user submitting an access request.

SailPoint specifically states that organizations can allow users to request roles when the role cannot easily be auto-assigned or when someone who does not meet its ordinary assignment criteria might legitimately require the access. To enable this behavior, an administrator edits the role's Access Requests configuration and turns on Allow Access Requests . The presence of an enable/disable setting itself demonstrates that requestability is optional rather than mandatory.

A role can therefore exist purely as automatically assigned business access, purely as requestable access where appropriate, or be configured according to the organization's access-governance design.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Roles, Access Requests, Requestable Roles and Automated Role Assignment.

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This approach is valid because Identity Security Cloud supports search-driven certification campaigns focused specifically on access items. An administrator can select Access Items , choose All Access Items Returned by a Query , and use Search to identify privileged entitlements, access profiles, or roles. The privileged:true field is supported for access-item data and identifies access designated as privileged. Identities possessing the selected access items are then included in the campaign.

The reviewer configuration also meets the requirement. For appropriate search-based certification types, Manager can be selected as the reviewer. Identity Security Cloud then assigns each identity's access review to that identity's manager. Therefore, managers review the privileged access belonging to their own subordinates rather than having a single central certifier review the entire population. If an identity has no manager, SailPoint provides fallback handling by assigning the certification to the campaign creator.

This combines privileged-access filtering with manager-based governance and directly satisfies the scenario.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Search-Based Certification Campaigns, Access Item Certifications, Privileged Access and Manager Reviews.

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The statement correctly describes the communication model used by SailPoint Virtual Appliances. The critical architectural principle is that communication between a customer-hosted VA and Identity Security Cloud is initiated outbound from the VA . SailPoint does not establish unsolicited inbound connections from its cloud environment directly into the customer's VA.

SailPoint specifically documents that each VA makes continuous outbound-only calls to the cloud environment and polls the cluster queue for requested actions , including aggregation and provisioning work. The appliance retrieves the work assigned to its cluster, executes the appropriate connector operation against the customer source, and communicates the resulting information back to Identity Security Cloud.

This polling model is significant from a network-security perspective because customers do not need to create inbound firewall rules allowing Identity Security Cloud to initiate sessions into their internal environment. Instead, the VA requires appropriate outbound connectivity to SailPoint's required endpoints.

Therefore, describing VAs as initiating communication to their cluster queue accurately reflects the supported VA architecture.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — VA Cluster Architecture, Cluster Queue Polling, Outbound-Only Communication and Connector Operations.

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Yes. Removing the @entitlements(name:Manager_Access) portion produces a valid identity-oriented query structure. Identity Search supports the @access(...) nested object because an identity can possess multiple access items. SailPoint specifically documents @access(displayName:...) for identifying identities that possess a named access item and @access(source.name:...) for locating identities whose access originates from a particular source. Nested access queries can be combined with ordinary identity fields by using Boolean operators.

The remaining query therefore applies three conditions correctly: the identity must have been created during the specified 24-hour range, and the identity must satisfy either the New_Hire_Access condition or the Acme_HRMS source-access condition.

The problem with the original expression is the @entitlements(...) nested object. In SailPoint's searchable data models, @entitlements is used when examining objects such as access profiles or roles that contain entitlements; it is not the appropriate nested object for identity-level access searches. Identity-level entitlement holdings are searched through @access(...).

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Search, Nested Queries, Identity Access Fields and Boolean Query Construction.

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Gather data from requestor to build search query.

Run the query to gather results.

Save and name the search query.

Schedule saved search query on a month cadence as requested.

The sequence follows the correct Identity Security Cloud Search workflow. First, the administrator must gather the audit requirements from the requestor, including which distribution list, identities, access attributes, or other conditions must be evaluated. Those requirements are then translated into an appropriate Search query. Second, the query must be executed so the administrator can confirm that it returns the intended records before automating it.

After validating the output, the administrator saves and names the query. Identity Security Cloud requires the query to exist as a saved search before a recurring subscription can be configured. Finally, the saved search is scheduled according to the requested monthly cadence. SailPoint supports subscriptions to saved searches with Daily, Weekly, and Monthly schedules and allows administrators to specify the numerical days of the month and execution times. Therefore, scheduling must occur after the query has been constructed, tested, and saved.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Search, Building Search Queries, Saved Searches, Search Subscriptions and Scheduled Reporting.

The statement is incorrect. Identity Security Cloud does not use majority voting within a Governance Group for an access-request approval step. When a Governance Group is configured as a reviewer, only one eligible member of that Governance Group is required to approve or deny the request on behalf of the group .

SailPoint explains that when an access request reaches a Governance Group, its members receive the applicable review assignment. Once one member makes the decision, the review is treated as completed for that Governance Group and disappears from the other members' pending approval lists.

This should not be confused with a multi-step approval process containing several separate reviewers. If the access item is configured with multiple required reviewer stages, each required stage must approve before provisioning occurs. However, a Governance Group itself represents one reviewer stage, and that stage does not require approval from 50%, a majority, or every member.

Therefore, requiring a majority of Governance Group members is not how standard Identity Security Cloud Governance Group approvals operate.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Governance Group Approvals, Access Requests, Multi-Approver Processes and Group Review Decisions.

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The proposed statement is incorrect because the displayed search syntax is malformed. To search for identities whose account count falls within an inclusive numerical range, Identity Security Cloud uses range-query syntax with properly matched square brackets.

The correct expression is:

accountCount:[1 TO 4]

Square brackets indicate that both endpoints are included. Therefore, a correctly formatted query would return identities with account counts of 1, 2, 3, or 4. The displayed expression, however, is missing the closing square bracket and does not follow the documented range syntax correctly.

The accountCount field represents the number of accounts associated with an identity across connected sources. Range searches are useful when administrators need to identify identities with unusually low or high account ownership, investigate orphaned access patterns, or perform access-analysis activities.

Because the specific proposed command is syntactically incomplete, it cannot reliably be treated as the documented query that returns identities with one through four accounts.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Search Query Syntax, Range Queries, Identity Search Fields.

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The statement is correct. Identity Security Cloud allows administrators to configure a requestable role so that reviewers must provide justification when denying the requested access.

When configuring a role for access requests, administrators can enable the role for requests, define its approval process, and configure Require Comments behavior. SailPoint specifically provides an option named When a reviewer denies the request . Enabling this setting requires the reviewer to enter a comment or reason when rejecting the role request.

This requirement strengthens governance and auditability. A denial without explanation provides limited evidence about why the access was considered inappropriate. Requiring a comment records the business or security reasoning behind the decision, which can later assist administrators, access owners, auditors, and compliance personnel in understanding the approval history.

Comment requirements can also be configured at other stages, including when the requester submits the access request. Similar denial-comment controls exist for directly requestable entitlements.

Therefore, requiring a reviewer to document the reason for rejection is a supported role-request configuration.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Requestable Roles, Approval Processes, Require Comments and Access Request Governance.

No. The statement is too restrictive and misunderstands SailPoint's Search data models. The nested object @entitlements(...) is available in contexts where the searched object can contain multiple entitlements. Access profiles are one such category, but they are not the only applicable category. SailPoint's searchable-field documentation also defines entitlement nested fields for roles. Therefore, @entitlements(name:Manager_Access) cannot be characterized as inherently returning only access profiles associated with that entitlement.

The search category matters. Identity Search uses the @access(...) nested object to identify the access held by identities. For example, an identity holding a Manager_Access entitlement can be searched through an appropriate @access(...) expression. Conversely, when querying access-profile or role records, @entitlements(...) can filter those objects according to entitlements contained within them.

The original query is consequently invalid as a coherent identity query because it combines identity-oriented fields and @access(...) expressions with an entitlement-container nested construct belonging to different searchable object models.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Searchable Fields, Nested Objects, Identity Search, Access Profiles and Role Search Models.

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The statement is incorrect. A Virtual Appliance is primarily a secure connectivity and connector-execution component that enables Identity Security Cloud to communicate with sources located inside an organization's private network or otherwise inaccessible directly from the SailPoint cloud environment.

During aggregation, the VA can communicate with the source and transmit relevant account, identity, group, and entitlement information to Identity Security Cloud. However, the Virtual Appliance is not intended to function as the persistent entitlement repository or search-indexing database.

Entitlement information used for access modeling, certifications, governance, search, roles, access profiles, and policy analysis is managed within the Identity Security Cloud platform. The VA facilitates source communication and executes connector-related operations such as aggregation and provisioning when required.

This architectural distinction is important because Virtual Appliances should not be treated as local databases containing governance data. Their primary responsibilities are secure connectivity, execution of integration workloads, and communication between SailPoint's cloud services and enterprise-managed systems.

Study Guide Reference: Virtual Appliances — VA Architecture, Source Connectivity, Aggregation and Provisioning Operations.

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The statement is valid. The Identity Security Cloud Active Directory connector supports substantial identity-lifecycle functionality, including account aggregation, creation, modification, entitlement management, password-related operations, and provisioning. SailPoint documents Active Directory account provisioning and the use of Identity Security Cloud provisioning policies to create and manage accounts on the directory.

Active Directory can also serve as an authentication source through Pass-Through Authentication (PTA) . With PTA configured for an identity profile, users can authenticate to Identity Security Cloud using the network password associated with their Active Directory account. Identity Security Cloud passes the authentication operation through to the configured directory source rather than requiring a separate local SailPoint password.

Therefore, the AD integration is not restricted to account aggregation or read-only identity data. It can participate in both authentication and lifecycle administration, including provisioning users and managing access. Appropriate service-account permissions, VA connectivity, and provisioning configuration are required.

Study Guide Reference: Sources — Active Directory Connector, Pass-Through Authentication, Account Aggregation and Provisioning.

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The statement accurately describes the function of an Identity Provider in a federated authentication architecture. An IdP authenticates users and provides trusted identity or authentication information to a Service Provider. This enables the Service Provider to rely on an established trust relationship instead of independently validating the user's primary credentials.

In a SAML-based implementation, the Identity Provider authenticates the user and generates a signed SAML assertion. The assertion contains information that allows the Service Provider to determine that the user's authentication has been successfully completed. Depending on configuration, additional identity attributes can also be included.

Identity Security Cloud can operate as a SAML Service Provider and rely on an organization's external Identity Provider for user authentication. This allows enterprises to centralize authentication and integrate SailPoint access with existing single sign-on infrastructure.

The critical concepts are trust, centralized authentication, and secure transfer of authentication assertions between the IdP and Service Provider. The proposed statement correctly identifies each of these fundamental IdP responsibilities.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Federated Identity, Identity Providers, SAML Authentication, Service Provider Integration.

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Yes. Checking these mapped attributes is a primary troubleshooting action for an Identity Exception. Identity Security Cloud defines User Name (uid) , Work Email (email) , and Last Name (lastname) as required identity attributes. Every identity profile must contain mappings for these attributes, and none of the resulting identity values can be null. User Name carries the additional requirement of being unique across identities in the tenant.

When an authoritative-source account is missing one or more required values during aggregation, Identity Security Cloud generates an Identity Exception instead of creating the identity normally. A duplicate User Name can also produce an exception. The administrator should therefore inspect the Identity Exceptions report, identify which required attribute is absent or invalid, and verify the corresponding source-account data and identity-profile mappings.

SailPoint's documented remediation is to correct the problematic source information and then aggregate the source again, either manually or through the next scheduled aggregation. If direct mapping cannot generate a required value, a transform or supported rule can derive it.

Study Guide Reference: Identity and Lifecycle Management — Identity Profiles, Required Identity Attributes, Identity Exceptions and Attribute Mappings.

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This can be a valid reason, depending on the manager-review campaign mechanism being used. In a search-based certification campaign where Manager is selected as the reviewer, Identity Security Cloud determines the reviewer from each identity's manager relationship. If an identity does not have a manager defined, SailPoint documents that the certification is reassigned to the creator of the campaign . If the campaign creator is an administrator, the certification therefore appears assigned to that administrator instead of a manager.

The absence of a manager can originate from authoritative HR data, an incomplete manager attribute mapping, failed manager correlation, or otherwise missing manager information on the identity.

A distinction is important: traditional Manager Campaigns require identities to have managers defined and identities without managers are normally excluded. SailPoint recommends using a Search-based campaign with Manager selected as reviewer when identities without managers must still be included.

Given the scenario explicitly states that the certification was reassigned to an admin, missing manager information is therefore a technically valid explanation for the observed fallback assignment.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Certifications, Manager Review, Search-Based Campaigns and Identities Without Managers.

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The statement accurately reflects the Search-based reporting model represented by Identity Security Cloud. Search is not limited to interactive investigation. Administrators can create a useful search query, save it, and configure a recurring subscription so that Identity Security Cloud generates and distributes the results automatically on a defined schedule.

The important workflow is that the query must first be executed and stored as a saved search. A subscription can then be attached to that saved search, with configuration for scheduling, timezone, and recipients. The scheduled execution returns records from the results category or tab that was selected when the saved search was created.

This functionality effectively turns a valid, reusable Search query into a scheduled reporting mechanism. It is particularly useful for recurring governance monitoring, audit review, identity-analysis tasks, entitlement investigations, and event reporting. SailPoint documentation states that automatic scheduled emails can contain the results of a saved search query and that subscriptions can be configured on recurring schedules.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — Search, Saved Searches, Scheduled Search Reports and Subscriptions.

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The statement is correct. Identity Security Cloud defines several identity attributes by default, but User Name (uid) , Work Email (email) , and Last Name (lastname) have special required-status rules. SailPoint documentation states that these three attributes must have mappings for every identity profile and cannot be null for any identity.

User Name has an additional uniqueness requirement: it must be unique across identities from all identity profiles in the tenant. Work Email must contain a non-null value, although Identity Security Cloud does not itself validate that the value conforms to a syntactically valid email-address format. Last Name likewise must be populated.

Administrators therefore need to ensure that the authoritative-source data, source mappings, transforms, or rules reliably generate these required values. If authoritative data cannot directly populate a required field, a transform or other supported mapping mechanism should be used to derive the necessary value.

These requirements help maintain consistent identity representation and support core platform functions such as identity correlation, display, authentication, and governance.

Study Guide Reference: Identity and Lifecycle Management — Identity Profile Attributes, Required Attribute Mappings, User Name, Last Name and Work Email.

1. An IT company grants system administrators elevated permissions to manage critical servers and network configurations. These administrators use unique, secure credentials and multi-factor authentication to access sensitive systems, ensuring that only qualified personnel can perform high-risk tasks.

Select a match:

Answer: Privileged Access

2. A payroll administrator at a financial services company is responsible for processing employee salaries. Due to staffing shortages, they are also given approval access for salary disbursements, meaning they can both enter and approve payroll transactions.

Select a match:

Answer: Separation of Duties (SOD)

3. A customer support agent in a healthcare company accesses a patient's full medical history and Social Security number to verify their identity for a simple billing inquiry.

Select a match:

Answer: Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

The first scenario represents Privileged Access because system administrators hold elevated permissions that allow them to perform sensitive, high-impact operations on critical infrastructure. SailPoint identifies privileged entitlements as access that can expose sensitive data or create elevated security risk, making stronger controls such as MFA and dedicated credentials appropriate.

The second scenario represents Separation of Duties (SOD) . Allowing the same payroll administrator both to enter payroll transactions and approve salary disbursements creates conflicting responsibilities. SailPoint's SoD model specifically exists to prevent one identity from possessing combinations of access that allow them to initiate and independently authorize sensitive business transactions.

The third scenario involves Personally Identifiable Information (PII) because medical information combined with a Social Security number directly exposes sensitive information associated with an identifiable individual.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Separation of Duties, Privileged Access, Sensitive Data and Identity Governance Controls.

Yes. This is a classic Separation of Duties scenario. The individual requesting a significant system configuration change should not also possess the authority to independently approve that same change. Combining requester and approver responsibilities eliminates an important independent-control checkpoint and allows one person to initiate and authorize a potentially high-impact administrative operation.

SailPoint's official SoD guidance specifically uses major system configuration changes as an example: significant configuration changes should be approved by someone other than the person requesting the change. SoD policies are designed to identify and govern combinations of access that would enable such conflicting responsibilities.

From a governance perspective, the requester initiates the business or technical need, while an independent reviewer determines whether the requested change is appropriate, authorized, and sufficiently controlled. Separating these functions reduces fraud, accidental misconfiguration, privilege abuse, and unauthorized system modification. Where conflicting access already exists, Identity Security Cloud can identify the associated SoD violation for investigation and remediation.

Therefore, allowing the requester to approve their own major system change represents exactly the type of control conflict that SoD is intended to prevent.

Study Guide Reference: Supporting Governance — Separation of Duties, Requester/Approver Conflicts, Internal Controls and SoD Policy Enforcement.

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The statement is explicitly incorrect. Identity Security Cloud allows users to hold multiple User Levels in many circumstances, and permissions from compatible User Levels are cumulative. However, SailPoint defines several combinations that cannot be assigned simultaneously because their delegated administrative scopes conflict.

One of the specifically prohibited combinations is Role Admin and Source Sub-Admin . SailPoint's User Level documentation lists this pair among the User Levels that cannot coexist on the same user. Other prohibited combinations include Role Sub-Admin with Source Admin, Role Sub-Admin with Role Admin, and Source Sub-Admin with Source Admin.

The distinction is important. A Role Admin has broad role-management privileges, whereas a Source Sub-Admin receives scoped administrative capabilities based on Governance Group associations with particular sources. Combining certain global and scoped administrative models could create inconsistent authorization behavior, so SailPoint prevents those assignments.

Administrators should therefore consult the User Level compatibility matrix before granting multiple elevated permissions rather than assuming that every User Level can be stacked.

Study Guide Reference: Platform — User Level Permissions, User Level Compatibility, Role Admin and Source Sub-Admin.

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This is not a valid description of how a canceled access request is handled. A cancellation terminates the request before it completes. Once an access request has entered a concluded Canceled state, it is no longer simply a pending approval waiting for an administrator to substitute a decision for the assigned reviewer.

Approval Management does give administrators powerful controls over pending governance work. Administrators can inspect requests, reassign current approvers, send reminders, cancel requests, and, where supported, overwrite the current approval step. Overwriting an approver is fundamentally different from reversing an already canceled request: the administrator is acting on the current approval step of an active request.

SailPoint documentation explicitly identifies Canceled as a concluded status and defines cancellation as termination of the request. The administrator's overwrite capability applies to an approval step, not to resurrecting a request after cancellation. A new request would normally be required when access is still needed after the original request has been terminated.

Study Guide Reference: Access Management — Approval Management, Access Request Status, Administrative Approval Actions.

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